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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF
UNITED STATES SECURITIES ACTIONS AFTER
MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIAN BANK
Nathan Lee*
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Black Tuesday, the infamous Wall Street
crash of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 These two Acts sought to ensure legitimacy in the securities market by, among other things, regulating
and preventing deceptive conduct in securities transactions.2 As the
business world expanded, technology improved, and the world became
smaller (so to speak), many securities transactions took on a transnational character involving parties from around the globe.3 To ensure
the legitimacy of these transactions and to protect the American public, courts expanded the scope of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act to cover these transactions.4 Courts began to apply
the Securities Acts to conduct that occurred extraterritorially, or
outside the U.S.5 This extraterritorial application continued for over
forty years6 until the Supreme Court abruptly put an end to that extraterritoriality in 2010.7
In Morrison v. National Australian Bank, the Supreme Court
held that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law prevented the Securities Exchange Act from being applied to
* Law clerk for the Honorable James O. Browning, District of New Mexico, 20142015 term; J.D., 2014, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I
would like to thank Professor Peter Flynn for the insight and feedback he provided
for this article.
1
Rosemary J. Thomas, Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory: A “Basic”ally
Good Idea Whose Time Has Arrive, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 22 IND. L. REV. 1061,
1062–64 (1989).
2
Id.
3
See Eric D. Peterson, Transnational Securities Fraud Jurisdiction Under Section 10(b): The Case for a Flexible and Expansive Approach, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 637 (1990).
4
See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968), overruled
by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
5
See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1019, 1026 (2011).
6
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247.
7
See id. at 273.
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foreign conduct regardless of the effects within the United States.8 The
presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction that presumes acts of Congress only apply domestically, unless Congress gives a clear indication that they should apply abroad.9
Despite this bar on the extraterritorial application of the Securities
Acts, the Court’s analysis and subsequent acts of Congress create the
possibility that some antifraud provisions may still apply abroad. This
article focuses on those provisions and under what circumstances they
may apply extraterritorially.10
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The presumption against extraterritoriality made its first appearance in 1818.11 In United States v. Palmer, the U.S. government
brought a criminal piracy charge against three foreigners for robbing a
Spanish ship on the high seas.12 The government argued that the
piracy statute’s broad terms—applying to “any person or persons”—
meant that it applied against the defendants even though the crime
took place on the high seas and involved a Spanish ship.13 Writing for
the Court, Justice Marshall held that the statute did not apply to the
foreign conduct because the legislature did not intend the statute to
apply so broadly and “the intent of the legislature determine[s] the”
scope of the statute.14
The Court soon showed its amicability to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law by applying the same statute against a U.S.
citizen for piracy against a stateless vessel.15 Writing for the Court
again, Justice Marshall distinguished Palmer on the grounds that the
8

See id. at 265. Other courts soon applied the presumption to the 1933 Securities
Act as well. See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 522,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
9
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255.
10
This Article focuses only on the antifraud provisions of the Acts and not other
provisions, such as ones that regulate filings or administrative functions. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (filing statements); 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (selling unregistered
securities); 15 U.S. § 78m (filing reports by issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (registration
of brokers and dealers).
11
See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 611 (1818); see also Colangelo, supra
note 5, at 1033.
12
Palmer, 16 U.S. at 611.
13
Id. at 631.
14
Id. at 631–32; see also Colangelo, supra note 5, at 1061. Justice Marshall also
rested the holding on international law limitations. See Palmer, 16 U.S. at 631–32.
Since Palmer, international law has transformed to permit broader extraterritorial application of a nation’s laws; Colangelo, supra note 5, at 1023–24.
15
United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 151–52 (1920).
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defendant was a U.S. citizen and the ship was a stateless vessel—compared to the Spanish vessel in Palmer.16 These two considerations led
Justice Marshall to conclude that the defendant’s conduct came
squarely within Congress’s intended reach of the statute.17
It was not until 1909 that the Supreme Court first applied the
presumption against extraterritoriality outside the high seas context
in American Banana v. United Fruit.18 There, the Court refused to apply the Sherman Act against a U.S. company that was operating
abroad.19 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, reasoned that the
Court should construe the “statute as intended to be confined . . . to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
power.”20 This reasoning created a strict territorial approach to the
presumption.21 However, the Court soon abandoned this approach.22
In United States v. Bowman, the Court held that a statute
criminalizing fraud against government-owned corporations applied to
conduct in Brazil.23 The Court distinguished American Banana on the
grounds that it “was a civil case” and “the same rule of interpretation
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction,
but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.”24 Thus, the criminal nature of the case permitted the statute’s extraterritorial application even though the result would have been different if it were a civil
statute.25
In 1991, the Supreme Court applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.26 The Court held
that Congress’s intent governed Title VII’s extraterritorial scope.27 To
discern this intent, the Court focused on the text of the statute.28 To
apply extraterritorially, the Court held that Congress “need[ed] to
16

Colangelo, supra note 5, at 1064–65.
See id. at 1065.
18
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356, 357 (1909).
19
See id. at 359.
20
Id. at 357.
21
See id.
22
See generally United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 103 (1922) (applying the
U.S. Criminal Code extraterritorially to acts that defrauded the U.S. government).
23
See id. at 102.
24
Id. at 98.
25
See id. at 98, 102–103.
26
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 246,
246–47 (1991).
27
See id. at 248.
28
See id. at 248.
17

626 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

make a clear statement that [the] statute applies overseas.”29 This
“clear statement” rule, however, was discarded in Morrison v. National
Australian Bank.30 In applying the presumption to Section 10(b) of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, the Court did not require a “clear statement” for extraterritoriality since “context can be consulted as well.”31
Instead, the Court required a “clear indication” that Congress intended the Act to apply extraterritorially.32
In its latest articulation of the presumption, the Supreme
Court held that the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) does not apply extraterritorially.33 In determining the extraterritorial reach of the ATS, the
Court examined both the text of the statute as well as the historical
context surrounding its enactment.34 Specifically, the Court focused on
two historical events—the harassment of a French ambassador and
seizure of slaves from a ship at port—to conclude that Congress did
not intend the ATS to apply extraterritorially.35
II.

EXTRATERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

SECURITIES LAWS

The 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts are generally silent in regards to their extraterritorial reach. Section 30 of the 1934 Act seems
to prohibit its extraterritorial application while providing narrow exceptions.36 Section 30(b) precludes the extraterritoriality of the Act
stating that “[t]he provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a
business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States.”37
Section 30(b) then provides a narrow exception by stating that the prohibition does not apply to regulations “the Commission may” enact to
“prevent the evasion” of the Act.38 Section 30(a) also provides an additional exception.39 Section 30(a) explicitly permits extraterritorial application against brokers or dealers for transactions on foreign
exchanges when the issuer is an U.S. company.40 The exceptions in
Sections 30(a) and 30(b) are fairly narrow in light of the general prohi29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See id. at 258.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
Id. (Morrison is addressed in-depth below. See infra Part II.B.)
Id. at 255.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
See id. at 1665–69.
See id. at 1666–69.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2012).
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2012).
Id.
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bition in Section 30(b). Yet, despite Section 30(b), courts began to apply the 1934 Act in an extraterritorial manner.41
A.

Schoenbaum and Its Progeny

Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act42 and SEC rule 10b-5, which Congress promulgated under Section 10(b),43 are the most frequently litigated securities laws.44 The Second Circuit first applied Section 10(b)
extraterritorially in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.45 The court held that
Section 10(b) applied extraterritorially despite the lack of affirmative
language in the Act and despite “the specific language of Section
30(b).”46 The importance of Section 10(b) and the effect that foreign
transactions have on domestic investors led the court to hold that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply extraterritorially.47 Four years later,
in Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Maxwell, the Second Circuit
expanded the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) to cover claims
where deceptive conduct occurred in the U.S., even though the actual
sale of securities took place abroad.48 The court in Leasco held that
when deceptive conduct occurred domestically, the presumption
should not apply because the statute’s application is domestic not foreign since it is being used to regulate the domestic deceitful conduct.49
The court reasoned that, even though the statute is silent on the issue,
“if Congress had thought about the point,” it would have wanted Section 10(b) to apply in that case.50
Subsequent courts used Schoenbaum and Leasco to formalize
two tests that determined Section 10(b)’s extraterritorial reach.51
These two tests are (1) the “effects test”—“whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United
States citizens” and (2) the “conduct test”—“whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.”52 Other Circuits soon adopted
41

See infra Part III.A.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
43
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
44
See Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws,
57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1256–57 (2003) (quoting SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453, 465 (1969)).
45
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) overruled by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
46
Id. at 206.
47
Id.
48
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)
overruled by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
49
See id. at 1334.
50
Id. at 1337.
51
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
52
See S.E.C. v. Burger, 322 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
42
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these two tests53 until almost every circuit used some form of the two
tests and applied Section 10(b) extraterritorially.54
B. Morrison v. Australian National Bank
Due to Schoenbaum and Leasco, before 2010, it was generally
accepted that the Section 10(b) applied extraterritorially.55 Morrison
abruptly reversed this thinking and forty years of precedent. Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia criticized Schoenbaum and Leasco.56 He
rejected the Second Circuit’s case-by-case analysis and held that the
presumption applies “in all cases.”57 He then took it upon himself to
determine, anew, whether the presumption precludes extraterritorial
application of Section 10(b).58 The Court held that there must be a
“clear indication” showing Congress’s affirmative intent that Section
10(b) applies extraterritorially.59 While the Court noted that the context surrounding the Act’s passage may be considered,60 the Court relied heavily on the text of the 1934 Act in determining its
inapplicability to extraterritorial conduct.61
1. Extraterritoriality of Section 10(b)
In determining the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b), the
Court first looked to the text of the statute.62 The Court noted that the
text was silent on the issue.63 Section 10(b) refers to “interstate commerce,” which is defined in Section 3 as “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any
foreign country.”64 However, the Court believed that this “general reference to foreign commerce” was insufficient to provide a clear indication.65 The Act’s reference to “foreign countries” in Section 2, which
sets out the Act’s purpose,66 was also too general to create a clear indi53
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880; see also Kauthar SDN BHD v. Steinberg, 149
F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 33
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424–25 (9th Cir. 1983).
54
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 274, n.2 (Stevens, J. concurring in judgment).
55
See id. at 256.
56
See id. at 261.
57
See id.
58
Id. at 262.
59
See id. at 255.
60
Id. at 265.
61
See id. at 275 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment).
62
See id. at 262.
63
Id.
64
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (2012) (emphasis added).
65
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262–63.
66
15 U.S.C. § 78b(2) (2012).
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cation of the legislative intent.67 Bolstering its argument against extraterritoriality, the Court noted that Section 30(b) generally
prohibited extraterritoriality while permitting two narrow exceptions.68 This general prohibition with narrow exceptions indicates that
the remainder of the Act—everything other than Section 30—does not
apply extraterritorially.69 Therefore, Section 10(b) not only lacks a
clear indication of extraterritoriality, Section 30 indicates that it applies solely domestically.70
2. Scope of the Act (Transactional Test)
Determining that Section 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially was not enough to settle the matter in Morrison. Some of the deceptive conduct occurred in Florida even though the securities were
eventually purchased abroad.71 One party argued that because the
conduct was domestic the presumption did not apply.72 Justice Scalia
dismissed this argument by holding that “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in
the case.”73 He then formulated a new test for domesticity by looking
to the “focus” of the Act.74 The Court held that the “focus” of the Securities Exchange Act is the “purchase and sale” of securities.75 If the
purchase and sale of the security occurs in the U.S., the transaction is
domestic, but if the sale takes place abroad, which happened in Morrison, the transaction is foreign even though there may be some domestic conduct.76 This “focus” test has become known as the “transactional
test.”77
Under the transactional test, a court must first determine the
focus of the statute.78 The court will then determine where the conduct
67

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
Id. at 263; see 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2012).
69
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264–65
70
See id.
71
See id.at 253
72
See id. at 265–66.
73
See id. at 266 (emphasis in original).
74
See id.
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
Vladislava Soshkina, Note, Beyond Morrison: The Effect of the “Presumption
Against Extraterritoriality” and the Transactional Test on Foreign Tender Offers,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 277 (2012).
78
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan,
Transactional Dealings—Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L LAW. 829,
845 (2012).
68
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occurred that is at the focus of the statute.79 The transaction is localized at the focus.80 This localization of the entire transaction to a single point is similar to the “traditional approach to conflict of laws.”81 If
the localized point occurred abroad, then the transaction is foreign and
the presumption applies.82 But if the localized point occurred in the
U.S., then the transaction is domestic and the presumption does not
apply even though some of the conduct may have taken place abroad.83
C. Dodd-Frank
In response to Morrison, Congress amended the Securities Acts
with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”).84 Dodd-Frank specifically permitted extraterritorial jurisdiction for fraud cases brought by the SEC.85 The amendments sought to reverse Morrison by reinstating the conduct and
effects tests for SEC actions.86 They provide that:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a
violation of the antifraud provisions of this chapter
involving:
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if
the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has
a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States.87
79

See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266; see also, Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan,
supra note 78, at 845.
80
Colangelo, supra note 5, at 1080.
81
Id.
82
See Soshkina, supra note 77, at 284.
83
See id.
84
Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial Transaction, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431,
1448 (2011); see 15 U.S.C. § 78 aa(b) (2012) (1934 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (1933
Act).
85
15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(c), 78aa(b) (2012).
86
Steinberg & Flanagan, supra note 78, at 836–38.
87
15 U.S.C. § 78 aa (b) (2012). The amendment to the 1933 Act is identical to the
1934 Act, except that it only applies to actions brought under Section 17 (a) rather
than all antifraud provisions. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b) (“antifraud provisions)
with 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (“alleging violation of [Section 17(a)]”).
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This language from Dodd-Frank is problematic because it concerns jurisdiction.88 Before and after Morrison, courts had jurisdiction
to hear extraterritorial cases involving securities laws.89 Morrison
held that Section 10(b) did not apply extraterritorially, not that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.90 Thus, based solely on its
language, the Dodd-Frank amendment is essentially meaningless and
creates no change.91
Despite the inadequate language, the legislative history clearly
shows Congress’s intent to reverse Morrison.92 The contradiction between the text and the legislative history created confusion about
whether Dodd-Frank is jurisdictional (thus mere surplusage) or substantive (applying SEC fraud actions extraterritorially).93 Two courts
noted in dicta that Dodd-Frank does remedy Morrison’s anti-extraterritorial holding for SEC fraud actions.94 However, the only court to
take the issue head-on discussed the tension between the text of the
statute and the apparent legislative intent.95 In the end, the court was
unable determine if Dodd-Frank was jurisdictional or substantive.96
Thus, it is unclear whether Dodd-Frank has any substantive effect on
the SEC’s ability to bring fraud actions for extraterritorial violations.97
III.

EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION

OF

U.S. SECURITIES LAWS

Whether a private party or government entity brings an action
may affect whether the action applies extraterritorially. If a private
party brings an action, then the extraterritoriality analysis is unaffected by Dodd-Frank and by the underlying rationale for the presumption. Private actions are controlled by Morrison. However, suits
by a government entity may be affected by Dodd-Frank and by the
88

Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham, & Hellen Quackenbos, When Courts and
Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National
Australian Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision of the DoddFrank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2011).
89
Id.
90
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
91
Painter, Dunham, & Quackenbos, supra note 88, at 4.
92
Steinberg & Flanagan, supra note 78, at 837.
93
U.S. SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr. L.L.C., 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 916–17 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (failing to conclude whether Dodd-Frank Amendment is merely jurisdictional or substantive).
94
See SEC v. Tourre, No. 10 Civ. 3229(KBF), 2013 WL 2407172, at *1 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013); In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 865 F. Supp. 2d 451, 456 n.28
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
95
See Chi. Convention Ctr. L.L.C., 961 F. Supp. 2d 905 at 916–17.
96
Id.
97
Dodd-Frank will be discussed more in-depth later on. See infra Part III.B.2.
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underlying rationale for the presumption. Therefore, private actions
and government actions will be considered separately.
A. Private Actions
All private actions are subject to Morrison.98 As the Court in
Morrison held, every case under the securities statutes, other than
under Section 30, is subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality.99 Thus, the only question is whether the action is domestic or
foreign. This inquiry will depend on the focus of the statute.100 Morrison made the sweeping pronouncement “that the focus of the Exchange
Act is . . . upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States”
and that “the same focus on domestic transactions is evident in the
Securities Act of 1933.”101 Yet, not every provision of the Securities
Acts is focused on the purchase and sale of securities.102 Several courts
ruled that different provisions within the Securities Acts have different focuses.103 In SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., the Southern District
of New York ruled that the focus of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act
is different than the focus of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.104 The court ruled that a transaction may be domestic for Section
17(a) purposes even though it is foreign for Section 10(b) purposes.105
Therefore, each provision will be considered separately to determine
its focus and what constitutes domestic conduct.
A final consideration that will affect all private actions is found
in the last paragraph of Kiobel.106 In Kiobel, the Court held that
“claims [may sufficiently] touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”107 This language seems to indicate that the facts of a case may
“touch and concern” U.S. territory to such an extent that the presumption will be overcome.108 Several courts latched onto this language to
hold that the facts in a particular case were sufficient to overcome the
98

See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
Id. at 265.
100
Id. at 266–67.
101
Id.
102
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012) (regulating both the “sale” and “offer” of a
security).
103
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is focused on both the offer and sale of
securities while Section 10(b) is focused only on the sale).
104
Id. at 164–65.
105
See id. at 160, 165.
106
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
107
Id.
108
See Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d. 304, 323–24 (D.
Mass. 2013).
99
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presumption.109 Other courts, however, hold that only an affirmative
indication from Congress may overcome the presumption.110 Thus, the
specific facts of a case have no bearing on whether the presumption is
overcome.111
So far, the “touch and concern” analysis has not been applied in
the securities context. But, if Kiobel’s touch and concern language does
permit the facts in a case to overcome the presumption, then private
securities actions, which would normally be barred by Morrison, may
survive despite the presumption’s application.112 Therefore, in every
case, regardless of the provision’s focus, a plaintiff may argue that the
specific facts of the case sufficiently “touch and concern” U.S. territory
to overcome the presumption.113
1. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act114
Morrison explicitly bars the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b).115 If the sale of a security takes place abroad, even though
deceptive conduct occurs in the U.S., Section 10(b) does not apply.116
The place of the actual sale controls whether the transaction is foreign
or domestic.117 So, even if a security is listed on a U.S. exchange, if the
actual sale takes place abroad—such as securities listed on multiple
exchanges—then the transaction is foreign.118 Section 10(b) does not
apply to foreign sales.119
Courts may technically apply Section 10(b) extraterritorially in
certain cases. Morrison’s focus analysis localizes a transaction to a single point—the location of the sale.120 In Morrison, some of the deceptive conduct occurred domestically while the sale occurred abroad.121
If the facts had been flipped—foreign deceptive conduct but domestic
sale—then the transaction would have been localized at a domestic
109

See, e.g., id.
See Balintuno v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 (2d Cir. 2013).
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d. at 323-24.
113
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
114
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
115
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010).
116
See id.
117
See id.
118
See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
119
See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327,
336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
120
Colangelo, supra note 5, at 1080.
121
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 252 (2010).
110
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point and the presumption would not apply.122 According to Morrison,
deceptive foreign conduct that results in a domestic sale is a domestic
transaction.123 Even though the deceptive conduct occurred abroad,
U.S. law is applied under the fiction that the entire transaction occurred domestically.124 Even though the transaction is classified as domestic, U.S. law is still regulating foreign conduct.125 So, technically
Section 10(b) can be applied extraterritorially even though the Court
would classify its application as domestic.126
2. Section 11 of the 1933 Act
Section 11 of the 1933 Act prohibits “untrue statement[s]”
within a registration statement.127 Even though Morrison focused on
the 1934 Act, the Court held that the “same focus on domestic transactions is evident in the Securities Act of 1933.”128 Thus, the same focus
analysis is used for both Acts.129 Section 11 only provides a cause of
action to persons who acquired a security.130 This acquisition requirement is similar to the sale or purchase requirement in Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act.131 So, the focus of Section 11 is on the acquisition, or
purchase, of the security.132 Thus, its extraterritorial reach is the
same as Section 10(b).133 Section 11 applies extraterritorially in the
same manner as Section 10(b)—when deceptive conduct (misleading
statements or omissions) takes place abroad but the actual purchase
occurs domestically.134
122

See id. at 266–67.
See id. at 266, 268; see also Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto,
677 F.3d 60, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the transaction was domestic
though some deceptive conduct occurred abroad).
124
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–68 (2010).
125
But see id. at 266, 269.
126
But see id. at 267.
127
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
128
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 268 (2010) (emphasis added).
129
See, e.g., In re Smart Technologies, Inc. S’holder Litig., 295 F.R.D. 50, 55–56
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d
522, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
130
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (“any person acquiring such security . . . may, either at
law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue.”).
131
See In re Smart Technologies, Inc. S’holder Litig., 295 F.R.D. 50, 56–57
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013).
132
See id.
133
See id at 56.
134
See id. at 56.
123
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3. Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act
Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act creates two causes of action.135
First, Section 12(a)(1) provides a cause of action against “any person
who . . . offers or sells a security in violation of” Section 5 of the Act,136
which requires certain securities to have a registration statement.137
Second, Section 12(a)(2) provides a cause of action against “any person
who . . . offers or sells a security” with a prospectus that contains a
misleading statement or omission.138 A cause of action under Section
12(a)(2) is similar to Section 11,139 except that Section 12(a)(2) only
applies to misstatements contained in a prospectus rather than the
entire registration statement.140
On its face, Section 12(a) provides causes of action against two
classes of defendants: offerors and sellers.141 However, in Pinter v.
Dahl, the Supreme Court narrowed the class of potential defendants to
actual “sellers.”142 Section 12(a) states that an offeror or seller may be
liable “to the person purchasing such security from him.”143 The Court
reasoned that since Section 12(a) only provides a cause of action to
those who have purchased a security, only actual “seller[s]” of securities can be liable under Section 12(a).144 So, like Section 10(b) of the
1934 Act, Section 12(a) is focused on the sale of the security.145 Thus,
Section 12(a) only applies if the sale is domestic.146 Section 12(a), like
135

See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012).
Id. § 77l(a)(1).
137
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
138
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2)
139
See Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2011).
140
See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 576–77 (1995).
141
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012).
142
See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988).
143
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012).
144
See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647.
145
See In re Smart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 11 Civ. 7673(KBF), 295 F.R.D.
50, at 55–56 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); In re Vivendi Universal S.A., Sec. Litig., 842
F. Supp. 2d 522, 527–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Some have argued that the focus of Section 12 may be on the offer or the sale—in accordance with the actual text of the
Statute. See Richard A. Grossman, The Trouble with Dicta: Morrison v. National
Australian Bank and the Securities Act, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2013). However,
this analysis ignores Pinter, which narrowed the class of defendants to actual
“sellers.” See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647. Moreover, every court that has addressed the
extraterritoriality of Section 12 has focused on the place of the sale. See In re
Vivendi Universal S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 528–29.
146
See In re Smart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 11 Civ. 7673(KBF), at 55–56
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013); In re Vivendi Universal S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d
at 527–30.
136
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Section 11, can apply extraterritorially to deceptive conduct abroad as
long as the sale occurs domestically.
4. Section 9(f) of the 1934 Act
Section 9(f) provides a cause of action to persons who purchased or sold securities with unlawfully manipulated prices.147 Specifically, a person who manipulates the price of a security through
deceitful conduct;148 affects the value of a put, call, straddle, or option
in violation of SEC rules;149 or endorses a put, call, straddle, or option
in violation of SEC rules,150 may be liable to anyone who purchased or
sold a security and was injured by the manipulative conduct.151 Similar to Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 9(f) only provides a cause
of action to a person who actually purchased or sold a security.152
Thus, the focus of Section 9(f) is the same as Section 12(a) of the 1933
Act—the purchase or sale of the security.153 Section 9(f) applies only if
the purchase or sale takes place domestically, but it can be used to
regulate foreign deceptive conduct that results in a domestic sale.154
5. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act prohibits the solicitation of a
proxy in a manner that violates the 1934 Act or SEC regulations.155
The SEC promulgated Rule 14(a)(9) under its Section 14(a) authority.156 Rule 14(a)(9) prohibits the use of “false or misleading statements” in the solicitation of a proxy statement.157
So far, no court has construed the extraterritorial reach of Section 14(a). Under Morrison, the focus of Section 14(a) appears to be the
actual voting, which is the subject of the proxy. In Morrison, to ascertain the focus of Section 10(b), the Court disregarded the deceptive
conduct and fixated solely on the purpose of that conduct: the sale.158
The Court looked to the end result of the transaction—the culmination
147

See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
See id. § 78i(a).
149
See id. § 78i(b).
150
See id. § 78i(c).
151
Id. § 78i(f).
152
Compare id. § 77l(a) (“the person purchasing such security”) with id. § 78i(f)
(“any person who shall purchase or sell any security”).
153
See supra text accompanying notes 135–46.
154
Its extraterritorial application is the same as Section 12(a) of the 1933 Act,
which is to foreign deceptive conduct as long as the actual purchase or sale occurs
domestically. See supra text accompanying notes 135–46.
155
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012).
156
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011).
157
See id.
158
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–84 (2010).
148
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of the deceptive conduct.159 This end result, the sale, was the focus of
the statute.160 In the same way, the end result of a proxy—its purpose—is the shareholder’s vote.161 Any misleading statement in the
proxy culminates in affecting the vote. The focus of Section 14(a) is
thus the vote.162
Yet, regardless of the location of the vote, if the proxy concerns
securities of a “foreign private issuer,” Section 14(a) does not apply.163
SEC Rule 3a12-3 expressly exempts “foreign private issuer[s]” from
Section 14(a) liability.164 “[F]oreign private issuer[s]” are defined as
“any private issuer” that has more than fifty percent of its outstanding
voting shares held by foreign residents, or the majority of its “executive officers or directors” are not U.S. citizens or residents; less than
fifty percent of its assets are not located in the U.S.; and its business is
not “administered principally in the United States.”165 If a company is
a “foreign private issuer,” Section 14(a) does not apply.166
Therefore, if a company is not a foreign private issuer, the
place of the annual meeting, or where the actual voting occurs, determines if the transaction is foreign or domestic.167 If the meeting and
voting take place domestically, then Section 14(a) applies even if the
solicitation of the proxy, recipients of the proxy, and making of the
proxy occurred abroad. On the other hand, if the voting takes place
abroad, then the presumption applies and the conduct is beyond Section 14(a)’s reach.168
6. Section 16(b) of 1934 Act
Section 16(b) allows an issuer to recover an insider’s shortswing profits due to the purchase and sale of the issuer’s securities.169
This is a strict liability statute that merely requires the issuer to show
159

See id.
See id.
161
See Marlene Martin, Comment, Can Shareholders “Bring the Sun” To Climate
Change Disclosure?—Reflections on Shareholders’ Power To Fix Environmental
Problems Through Proposals on Climate Change, 14 WYO. L. REV. 289, 294–95
(2014).
162
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 6-6 at 2884.
163
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2013).
164
See id.
165
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2008).
166
17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3(b) (2013).
167
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–86 (2010).
168
See id.
169
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012); see also James D. Gordon III, Acorns and Oaks:
Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 62,
78 (2004) (explaining that while not an explicit antifraud provision, Section 16(b)
was enacted to address insider trading); Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Ineffi160
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“that there was (1) a purchase and (2) a sale of securities (3) by an
[insider] . . . (4) within a six-month period.”170 Similar to Section 10(b),
Section 16(b) is predicated on the purchase and sale of a security.171
Because the sale of the security creates the cause of action, the place of
the sale determines if the action is domestic or foreign.172 Thus, Section 16(b) will only apply if the sale is domestic. Also, like Section
14(a), foreign private issuers are exempt from Section 16.173 So, regardless of where the sale occurs, if the company is a foreign private
issuer, Section 16(b) will not apply.174
7. Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act
Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act provides a private right of action
to a person who relied on a false or misleading statement that was
filed with the SEC.175 Section 18(a) allows a person who “purchased or
sold a security at a price which was affected by” a false SEC filing to
recover their losses.176 Section 18(a) is “the most analogous express
private right of action” to Section 10(b).177 Since Morrison, no court
has construed the extraterritorial reach Section 18(a), and its focus is
unclear. Section 18(a) only provides a right of action to persons who
“purchased or sold a security,”178 making it similar to Sections 11 and
12(a) of the 1933 Act.179 The focus of those Sections is on the sale of
the securities.180
Some scholars, however, believe that the focus of Section 18(a)
is on the filing of the statements with the SEC and not on the sale.181
Because SEC filings occur domestically, if the focus is on the filing,
cient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1173
(2014).
170
Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1998).
171
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
172
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010).
173
See 17 C.F.R. 240.3a12-3(b) (2013).
174
See id.
175
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2012).
176
See id.
177
Joseph A. Grundfest, Damages and Reliance Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 69 BUS. LAW. 307, 313 (2014).
178
See id. at 340.
179
Compare id., with 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) and 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a).
180
See In re Smart Techs., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 11 Civ. 7673(KBF), 295 F.R.D.
50, 55–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also In re Vivendi Universal S.A., Sec. Litig., 842 F.
Supp. 2d 522, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
181
See Steinberg & Flanagan, supra note 77, at 852 n.204. See also Roger W.
Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in
the Aftermath of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
223, 262 (2011).
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Section 18(a) actions will always be domestic, and the presumption
will never apply.182 This is especially useful for plaintiffs who
purchase securities on a foreign exchange that are also listed on a domestic exchange.183 Section 10(b) focuses on the location of the actual
purchase, regardless of whether the security is listed on a domestic
exchange.184 For people who purchase foreign securities that are also
listed on a domestic exchange, Section 18(a) may provide a cause of
action in spite of Section 10(b)’s inapplicability.185
Despite some scholars’ belief that the focus of Section 18(a) is
on the filing and not the purchase, Morrison seems to indicate that,
like Section 10(b), the focus is on the sale. Section 10(b) requires deceptive conduct.186 Section 10(b) regulates not only the purchase or sale of
the securities, but also the deceptive conduct that affects the purchase
or sale.187 In Morrison, however, the Court ignored the predicate deceptive conduct in determining the focus of Section 10(b) by narrowing
in on the end result that was the culmination of that deceptive conduct—the purchase or sale.188 In the same way, Section 18(a) requires
deceptive conduct through a misleading statement in an SEC filing.189
Section 18(a) regulates not only the sale of the securities, but also the
statements that go into the SEC filing.190 The Supreme Court would
likely interpret Section 18(a) in the same way as Section 10(b): by ignoring the predicate deceptive conduct (SEC filings) and zeroing-in on
the end result of that conduct—the sale.191 Thus, the focus of Section
18(a) is likely the sale of the securities and not the SEC filing. So,
Section 18(a) extraterritorial reach will be the same as Section 10(b). If
a sale occurs domestically, Section 18(a) applies even if the filings were
prepared abroad, but if a sale occurs abroad, the presumption bars
Section 18(a) application.192

182

See Kirby, supra note 181, at 262.
See id. See also Steinberg & Flanagan, supra note 77, at 852 n.204.
184
See In re Vivendi Universal S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532–33
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). See also In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472–73
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Royal Bank of Scot. Grp. PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d
327, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
185
See Kirby, supra note 181, at 262–63.
186
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
187
See id.
188
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–84 (2010).
189
See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a).
190
See id.
191
See id.
192
See supra text accompanying notes 120–23.
183

640 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:4

8. Section 29(b) of the 1934 Act
Section 29(b) allows contracts to be voided that are made in
violation of the 1934 Act or in violation of SEC regulations.193 “Section
29(b) itself does not define a substantive violation of the securities
laws; rather, it is the vehicle through which private parties may rescind contracts that were made or performed in violation of other substantive provisions.”194 Courts are split on whether a contract must
violate the Act on its face or whether the contract may violate the Act
in its performance to be voidable under Section 29(b).195 Yet, regardless of how the violation occurs, courts agree that the contract must
violate a different provision of the Act to be voided.196
The question then is whether the focus of Section 29(b) is on
the contract (i.e. the making of the contract) or on the violated provision. From a logistical standpoint, the focus of Section 29(b) should be
on the actual violation—the other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. If the focus is on the contract, such as the place where it
was made, then parties could contract abroad to violate the securities
laws in order to avoid Section 29(b)’s application. Parties could form a
contract abroad that requires violating the Securities Exchange Act,
and when a party pursues rescission under Section 29(b), the presumption precludes application since the focus occurred abroad. It only
makes sense for the focus of Section 29(b) to be on the violated provision. So, whether courts apply Section 29(b) domestically depends on
which provision is violated. If Section 10(b) is violated, the location of
the sale will determine Section 29(b)’s application.197 But, if Section
14(a) is violated, the location of the vote will determine the application
of Section 29(b).198
B. Criminal or SEC Actions
Unlike private actions, extraterritorial actions by the SEC or
another government agency may have survived Morrison. Whether the
SEC can maintain an action for extraterritorial conduct will depend on
a court’s understanding of the presumption’s purpose and its interpretation of the Dodd-Frank amendments. Both the Supreme Court’s de193

15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (2012).
Berckeley Inv. Grp. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 205 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 206 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989).
195
Compare Drasner v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 485, 501–02
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (concerning a violation of the Act on its face) with Reg’l Prop., Inc.
v. Fin. & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 F.2d 552, 560 (5th Cir. 1982) (concerning
a violation of the Act on its face or as performed).
196
See Colkitt, 455 F.3d at 205.
197
See supra text accompanying notes 120–23.
198
See supra text accompanying notes 154–68.
194
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cision in United States v. Bowman199 and the Dodd-Frank
amendments200 provide the potential for extraterritoriality. Furthermore, even if a court were to hold that Bowman and Dodd-Frank do
not apply, government agencies can still bring securities actions for
extraterritorial conduct in the same way as private litigants if the focus of the statute occurs domestically.
1. United States v. Bowman
In Bowman, the Supreme Court applied a criminal antifraud
statute extraterritorially despite applying the presumption to a similar civil statute thirteen years earlier.201 The Court differentiated the
two statutes on the grounds that one was criminal and the other
civil.202 The Court reasoned that “the same rule of interpretation
should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not
logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction,
but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated.”203 Many courts
use this reasoning to apply a number of criminal statutes extraterritorially.204 Some courts interpret Bowman narrowly and hold that it
only permits extraterritorial application to criminal conduct that is
committed against the U.S. government.205 Other courts interpret
Bowman more broadly and consider governmental interests, the nature of the offense, and policy considerations to determine extraterritoriality.206 Yet, the underlying rationale for the presumption leads to
an even broader interpretation of Bowman.
199

See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
15 U.S.C. § 77v(c) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(b).
201
Compare Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102–03 with Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 514 (1909).
202
Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
203
Id.
204
Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Criminal Law After Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
137, 165 (2011); see, e.g., United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir.
1988) overruled by United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1992) overruling
recognized by United States v. Pace, 65 F. App’x 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2003).
205
See Clopton, supra note 204, at 165; see, e.g., Layton, 855 F.2d at 1395.
206
See Clopton, supra note 204, at 165; Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984,
986 (9th Cir. 1970) (government interests); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,
811 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing the nature of the offense); United States v.
Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1986) superseded by statute as recognized in United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993)
(discussing policy considerations).
200
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Courts have not been consistent in stating the true rationale
behind the presumption.207 Professor William Dodge has identified six
potential rationales for the presumption.208 These rationales include:
(1) “international law limitations on extraterritoriality;”209 (2) “consistency with domestic conflict-of-laws rules;”210 (3) preventing “international discord” due to conflicting U.S. and foreign laws;211 (4) “the
notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in
mind;”212 (5) “separation-of-powers concerns;”213 and (6) to “provide[ ]
legislators with a clear background rule which allows them to predict
the application of their statutes.”214
Courts have soundly rejected the first two rationales since they
were first articulated, and the sixth rationale does not hold much
weight since the Supreme Court has not consistently applied the presumption in a manner that provides predictability.215 Thus, the only
remaining rationales are preventing international discord, Congress
legislating with domestic concerns in mind, and separation-of-powers.216 Of these three, if courts were to universally adopt the separation-of-powers rationale, then the presumption should not apply to
actions brought by certain government agencies.
The separation-of-powers rationale is closely related to the prevention of international discord rationale, but it is more narrowed.217
As Professor Curtis Bradley noted, “the determination of whether and
how to apply federal legislation to conduct abroad raises difficult and
sensitive policy questions that tend to fall outside both the institutional competence and constitutional prerogatives of the judiciary.”218
The political branches—i.e. Legislative and Executive—are authorized
to set foreign policy and may create international discord if they so
207

See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 513–14 (1997).
208
See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 112–13 (1998).
209
Id. at 112.
210
Id.
211
See id. (citing Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
212
Dodge, supra note 208, at 112–13 (quoting Smith v. United States, 507 U.S.
197, 204 n.5 (1993)).
213
Id. at 113.
214
Id. at 90 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (Harvard University Press 1994)).
215
See Dodge, supra note 208, at 113, 122.
216
See id. at 112–13.
217
See id. at 120.
218
Bradley, supra note 207, at 516.
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please.219 The Judiciary may not.220 Justice Roberts expressed this
concern in Kiobel, where he wrote that the presumption “helps ensure
that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S.
law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by
the political branches.”221 Thus, while the political branches are free to
create international discord and affect foreign relations, the presumption ensures that the Judicial Branch does not do the same.222
Government agencies, such as the SEC, are arms of the Executive branch,223 which is authorized to create international discord.224
Thus, the presumption should not apply to actions brought by government agencies such as the SEC or Department of Justice.225 Several
courts have relied on this rationale and Bowman to hold that “[t]he
presumption that ordinary acts of Congress do not apply extraterritorially . . . does not apply to criminal statutes.”226
Despite the separation-of-powers rationale and Bowman, the
Second Circuit recently held that criminal actions for Section 10(b) violations were subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality.227
The court limited the holding in Bowman solely to cases in which the
government defends its own rights, such as preventing fraud against
itself.228 The Court relied on the text of Bowman and did not consider
the underlying rationale behind the presumption.229 So, while the argument that the presumption does not apply to actions by government
219

See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815,
861 (1997).
220
See id.
221
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013); see also
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (“[The] presumption
has special force when . . . construing treaty and statutory provisions that may
involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique
responsibility.”).
222
See David Keenan & Sabrina P. Shroff, Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously in Criminal Cases After Morrison and Kiobel, 45 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 71, 89 (2013).
223
See Joan M. Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225,
278–81 (2005) (noting that while an independent agency, the SEC is a part of the
Executive Branch with some legislative oversight).
224
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 219, at 861.
225
See Keenan & Shroff, supra note 222, at 90–91.
226
United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011); see United States
v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 700 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The ordinary presumption that laws
do not apply extraterritorially has no application to criminal statutes.”).
227
See United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
228
See id. at 73.
229
See id.
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agencies is theoretically sound, it will likely fail due to courts’ narrowing of Bowman and the refusal to consider the underlying purpose for
the presumption.230
2.

Dodd-Frank

Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Morrison, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which addresses the extraterritorial reach
of antifraud securities actions brought by the SEC.231 As noted above,
Dodd-Frank only addresses the extraterritorial jurisdiction of SEC actions and not the actual application of the antifraud provisions.232
This has created confusion as to whether Dodd-Frank effectuated any
change after Morrison regarding the extraterritorial reach of SEC
fraud actions.233 The only court to consider the issue could not determine whether Dodd-Frank had any effect, so it passed on the issue and
decided the case on other grounds.234
Despite the uncertainty caused by the text of Dodd-Frank, the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Kiobel suggests that Dodd-Frank permits
extraterritorial application for SEC fraud actions. In Morrison, the
Court held that a “clear statement” in the text of the statute is not
needed to overcome the presumption, but instead, “context can be consulted as well.”235 In Kiobel, the Court indicated what context it is concerned with. The Court in Kiobel examined the historical
circumstances surrounding the passage of the ATS to determine if it
was intended to apply extraterritorially.236 The Court specifically focused on the “[t]wo notorious episodes involving violations of the law of
230

See id.; Clopton, supra note 204, at 165. Vilar was a criminal action brought by
the Department of Justice, not an SEC action. See Vilar, 729 F.3d at 67. However,
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nations [that] occurred . . . shortly before passage of the ATS” to hold
that Congress was concerned with domestic conduct when it passed
the ATS.237 Because Congress passed the ATS in response to domestic
incidents, the Court reasoned that Congress intended for the ATS to
apply domestically.238
Congress passed Dodd-Frank shortly after Morrison was decided.239 The “incidents” that concerned Congress involved foreign conduct that violated the Securities Exchange Act.240 Under Kiobel’s
historical context analysis, Dodd-Frank should be construed as permitting the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws for fraud
actions brought by the SEC because Congress was addressing foreign
conduct when it passed the Act.241 The legislative history of DoddFrank further supports this view.
Congress drafted the Dodd-Frank amendments before the
Court ultimately decided Morrison; however, “[m]any observers predicted that the Court in Morrison would bar” some of the extraterritoriality of Section 10(b) and “the SEC wanted Congress to be
prepared.”242 Several congressional debates that took place after the
Morrison decision indicate that Congress intended for Dodd-Frank to
reverse Morrison.243 Moreover, if courts treat Dodd-Frank as merely
jurisdictional, it would be superfluous because it would essentially enact no change whatsoever since courts did not lack jurisdiction.244 The
only interpretation that reconciles the congressional intent and gives
effect to the provisions is one that construes Dodd-Frank as permitting
the SEC to apply the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act and Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act extraterritorially.245 Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that Dodd-Frank permits the SEC to bring extraterritorial
fraud actions as long as the conduct or effects test is satisfied.246
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3. Focus Analysis
If neither Bowman nor Dodd-Frank applies extraterritoriality,
then SEC actions will be subject to the Morrison focus analysis.247
Whether a cause of action can be maintained depends on the focus of
the specific provision. For provisions that provide a private right of
action and can be enforced by the SEC, such as Section 10(b),248 the
focus is the same. Thus, the analysis for Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933
Act and Sections 9(f), 10(b), 14(a), 16(b), 18(a), and 29(b) of the 1934
Act will be the same as above.249 Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is the
main antifraud provision that does not provide a private right of
action.250
Section 17(a) provides essentially the same cause of action as
Section 10(b), except there is no scienter requirement.251 An additional
difference is that Section 17(a) applies to “any person” who “offer[s]” or
sells a security, while Section 10(b) only applies to a “purchase or sale
of” a security.252 The “offer or sale” language of Section 17(a) is similar
to Section 12(a),253 which only applies to sellers.254 Yet, unlike Section
12(a), Section 17(a) actions are not limited solely to someone who purchased a security.255 Thus, Pinter v. Dahl, which limited Section 12(a)
to sellers, does not apply.256 The focus of Section 17(a) is therefore not
only the sale of the securities, but also the offer.257
The Southern District of New York considered the focus of Section 17(a) in SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.258 The court noted that
“Section 17(a), unlike Section 10(b), applies not only to the ‘sale’ but
also to the ‘offer . . . of any securities.’”259 To determine what constitutes an offer, the court looked to the Act’s definition section.260 The
247
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Act defines “offer” as “every attempt or offer . . . or solicitation of an
offer to buy, a security . . . for value.”261 The court believed that this
language focused on the person making the offer and not the recipient
of the offer.262 Thus, “[i]n order for an ‘offer’ to be domestic, a person or
entity must (1) ‘attempt or offer[,]’ in the United States, ‘to dispose of’
securities . . . or (2) ‘solicit[,]’ in the United States, ‘an offer to buy’
securities.”263 In that case, the defendant made an offer via telephone
from the U.S. to someone in Germany.264 Because the defendant made
the offer in the U.S., in spite of the fact that the recipient was abroad,
the court considered the conduct domestic and did not apply the presumption.265 Therefore, if either the sale occurs in the U.S. or an offer
is made from the U.S., the focus of Section 17(a) is domestic, and the
presumption does not apply.266 However, if the sale occurs and the offer is made abroad, the conduct is foreign, and the presumption bars
Section 17(a) application.267
CONCLUSION
While Morrison sought to cut off the extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act, the Court’s focus analysis left
open the possibility of extraterritoriality. The focus analysis allows for
U.S. laws to be applied to foreign conduct as long as the focus occurs
domestically. Congress’s attempt to remedy Morrison in regards to
SEC fraud actions resulted in the poorly-worded and ambiguous DoddFrank Act. Yet, with Kiobel’s context analysis and the legislative history behind Dodd-Frank, it is likely that the SEC is free to bring extraterritorial antifraud actions. So, while Morrison may have curtailed
the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, their extraterritoriality is still alive and well.
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